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AGENCY.

It is a well established principle of the law of agency that a
principal is bound, so far as the outside world is concerned,
Apparent
not by the real, but by the apparent, authority of
Authority
the agent. This is conceded in Spooner v. Browning [1898], i Q. B. 528, in which the court, by a vote of two
to one, held that the fact that a firm of stockbrokers had on
three occasions filled orders brought them from the plaintiff
by a clerk of their own, was not evidence for the jury of a
holding out by them of the clerk as authorized to enter into
contracts on their behalf.
An agent to buy real estate may, legally speaking, buy it
himself and resell it to his principal at a higher price; but the
burden is heavy on him to show that his principal
Fraud,
Presumption was familiar with the transaction in all its details:
Jackson v. Pleasonton, 23 S. E. (Va.) 68o.
CARRIURS.

The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, has
recently decided in Snelling v. Yetter, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 917,
Warehouseman, that where a person who had goods in
defendant's warehouse terminated the storage
Assumption
of Character of aareement, paid all defendant's charges, surZ>
Common Carrier
rendered the contract and thereupon directed
defendant, who was also a common carrier, to deliver the goods
at her residence the same day, and paid the transportation
charges, and where defendant accepted and entered the order;
that from the time of such acceptance, the defendant assumed
the relation of a common carrier.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of New York, in In re Kenny, 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 1037, has recently decided that a statute making the
"Due Process term of imprisonment of a person committed to
the workhouse for public intoxication to depend
of Law,"
Term ot
upon the determination of the workhouse superinImprisonment tendent and commissioner of correction whether
such person has previously been convicted of a like offence,
without giving him an opportunity to be heard thereon, de371
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prives him of liberty without due process of law, within the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The charter of a turnpike road company exempting the
citizens of a certain town from paying toll, gives them a vested
right of which they cannot be deprived by a subVested
Rights,
sequent act of the legislature, unless a proper
Police Power exercise of the police power of the state requires

the change, or the interest of the general public demands it:
Louisville & T. Turnpike Road Co. v. Boss et al. (Court of
Appeals of Kentucky), 44 S. W. 981.
CONTRACTS.

The fact that a government -contractor was not a manufacturer of, or a regular dealer in, the articles he had contracted
Action for to supply, as required by Rev. St. U. S. § 3722,
Breach,
is unavailing as a defence in an action by the
Defence
contractor for failure to perform a contract made
by him with defendant to do certain work on the articles
embraced in the government contract: White v. McNulty
(Supreme Court, App. Div. of N. Y.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 903.
A contract entered into by a government contractor with
another to do certain work on articles which. he had agreed
to furnish the government, does not constitute an
assignment of the contract, within the purview of
the Rev. St. U. S. § 3737, prohibiting the transfer to another
of any contract or interest therein by the party to whom the
contract is given: Wbite v.
cNulty (Supreme Court, App.
Div. of N. Y.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 903.
A contracted to sell B 850 shares of capital stock, the
contract stipulating that if B failed to make the payments
thereon as agreed he should forfeit said stock,
Breach,
Penalty,

which should revert to A, and all claims against

B should thereupon cease. Held, that the forfeiture And reverter of the stock provided for in the contract
was not a penalty, but constituted an option in B. to either pay
the price and take the stock, or refuse to pay and forfeit the
stock, and a refusal to pay was not a breach of the contract:
Gallup v. Sterling et al. (Supreme Court of N. Y.), 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 942.
A company agreed to pay to defendants, who were patentees
of a button holder, a certain royalty on each button sold
within one year, and to sell not less than 250,000
Sales,
Option

Royalty,
Amount

buttons within that period.

Defendants gave the

company an option, on the expiration of the con-
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tract, either to renew the same or to buy the patent outright.
It was further agreed between the parties that if the company
should not sell 25o,ooo buttons, said company should lose
their option. Held, that defendants were entitled to a royalty
on 25o,ooo buttons, though the company sold a less number:
Meyer v. Brenzinger (Supreme Court, App. Term, N. Y.), 49
N. Y. Suppl. io9i.
A sought to obtain specific performance of an oral agreement alleged to have been made between him and B, his wife,
that B should purchase certain real estate, and
Specific
Performance, whenever she should sell the same she would pay
Evidence
to A one half of all she received after deducting
the purchase price. B denied making the agreement. Held,
that the alleged contract was too vague and uncertain to
entitle A to specific performance: Gouge v. Gouge (Supreme
Court, App. Div.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 879.
-CORPORATIONS.

In Burrows v. Niblack, 84 Fed. i II,the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has decided that it is "illegal " for
a national bank to purchase shares of its own
Purchase b
a Corporation stock otherwise than for the purpose of preventing
of its Own
a loss upon a pre-existing debt. The receiver of
Stock,
suhatneigto
, such a bank, without tendering back the stock,
Ultra
was permitted to recover from the vendor of the
stock the price which had been paid. The court sought to
distinguish the case from Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 62 1, and
Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99, and professed to assimilate it
to McCormick v. Bank, 165 U. S. 538, and Bank v. Kennedy,
167 U. S. 362. In the former case, a national bank, not yet
authorized by the Comptroller to transact business, took a
lease of a building for use as a banking house. Having held
possession of the premises for some time the bank abandoned
it; organization proceedings without transacting anyr business
-or receiving authority so to do. In an action upon the lease
a recovery was refused on the ground that the statutory
prohibition against transacting business without the Comptroller's permit made the lease absolutely void even between
the parties. In the latter case, a national bank, after purchase
of stock in another corporation, was sought to be held liable
as a stockholder therein. The court refused to enforce the
liability, assigning as a reason that the purchase was made
void by the prohibition in the Banking Act directed against
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such purchases.
These last two decisions represent the
remorseless application of the principles adopted by the court
in Thomas v. R. R., 101 U. S. 71, Central TransPortation Co.
v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, and cases of that
class. In the principal case, however, as the contract had
been fully performed on both sides it is doubtful whether, on
any theory, the decision can be justified. Certainly the rights
of the corporation, if any, are equitable rights and no recovery
should have been permitted without compelling restitution of
the stock. The case, therefore, may be said to represent the
remorseless miiapplicationof the principles appealed to by the
court.
Just as this number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER goes
to press, the daily papers announce the reversal by the
"UltraVires" Supreme Court of the United States of the
Contracts, decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third
Recovery in Circuit, in the last stage of the litigation over the
Quasi
lease by the Central Transportation Co. to the
Contract
Pullman Palace Car Co. Recovery of rental by
the lessor on the covenant in the lease was refused in 139
U. S. 24. The parties then went into equity and the lessor
obtained a decree for the payment of a large sum of money
found to be due upon the basis of an accounting for benefits
conferred. The amount of the recovery has now been cut
down to a figure which, as reported in the papers, seems to
indicate that nothing but the actual value of the corpus of the
leased property can be recovered by the lessor. The profession will await the opinion with great interest. The palpable
injustice of the decision and the manifest difficulty in the way
of permitting any recovery at all upon the court's theory of
corporate power will probably hasten the inevitable reaction
against the artificial doctrine of ultra vires contracts which
Mr. Justice Gray has done so much to fasten upon the court.
It is satisfactory to note the beginning of the reaction in the
reported dissent of two of the justices.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, while recognizing that majority stockholders cannot compel the minority
Reorganiza- to elect between a sale of their holdings and an
tion,
exchange for stock in a new concern, has neverRights of
theless emphasized the principle that the aggrieved
Minority,
minority may, by acquiescence in the reorganizaLaches
tion, estop themselves from asserting
their rights
in equity: Post v. Beacon Vacum Punp & Electrical Co., 84
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Fed. 371. In this case it appeared that the reorganization
plan involved the creation of a new corporation and the
transfer to it of the business and property of the old. The
stockholders of the old concern were to receive proportionate
holdings of stock in the new, with a privilege of subscribing
for the balance at a stated figure. The minority opposed the
transfer but subscribed for their pro rata "under protest and
to save their rights." Having done this and having allowed
the new concern to carry on the business for a year and a half,
the court thought it too late for them to invoke equitable relief.
Foreclosure proceedings are instituted upon a mortgage
securing bonds of a consolidated corporation of two different
From the time of consolidation the cornForeclosure states.
Proceedings, pany has exercised the franchises of a consolidated
Rights o
corporation without objection from the state or the
Unsecured
Creditors, stockholders. An unsecured creditor, having ob"Trust Fund" tained leave to intervene, now petitions (after a
decree of foreclosure) that the decree be vacated, the mortgages be adjudged invalid and the assets of the corporation
declared a trust fund to be distributed among unsecured
creditors. This relief the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, very properly refuses in Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry.Co., 84 Fed. 539. The court expresses
surprise that such relief should be sought. But the judges
have only their own loose reasoning to blame. Here, as in
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, the petitioning creditor was merely following out to a logical conclusion the untenable theory that the creditor of an insolvent
corporation has all the rights of a cestui que trust. One hopes
that the theory will not survive the blow which it received in
the Hollins Case. One also could wish that the courts would
cease to torture the doctrine of estoppel by invoking it, as in
the principal case, to support an obviously sound decision upon
a state of facts from which the elements of an estoppel are
wholly absent. Why not admit that the validity of a consolidation can be questioned only by the state or by stockholders?
This is all that can be meant by the sonorous announcement
that general creditors are " estopped."
Another illustration of a resort to the fiction of a "trust
fund" to justify a decision which in no sense involves trust
Purchaseof principles is to be found in Hamor v. Taylor-Rice
its Own
Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392 (Circuit Court, D.
Stock,
Delaware). A corporation bought shares of its own
"TrustFund, stock from a director and gave him a promissory
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note for the price.

The director sought to prove on this note

under an order made after the corporation had gone into the
hands of receivers. The court was of opinion that primafJaci
such a transaction involved an impairment of capital and that
the burden rested upon the claimant to show the existence at
the date of the note of a surplus adequate to meet it. In any
view the decision seems sound. The note having been given
on the verge of insolvency and without the passage of value
to the corporation, the director was bound to establish that
the promissor was in a condition which justified the giving
away of its property. On the other hand (assuming that the
question of insolvency was out of the case) it was proper
enough to place upon the claimant the burden of establishing
that no impairment of capital was involved. The court, however, preferred to resort to the theory that the capital stock of
a corporation is a trust fund for creditors and seems to have
been of opinion that the assertion of this proposition was a
satisfactory solution of all the problems involved.
CRIMINAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Co7n. v. Hill, 39
Atl. 1055, decided that the date of execution being no part t.f
the sentence, the mandate of the Governor, requiring the sheriff to cause the sentence to be
Appeal,
Supersedeas, executed on a day named, is in full force, and
Mandate of should be executed without undue delay, though
Governor the day named for the hanging has passed without
execution ; there having been no actual escape, but the sheriff
having delayed action, under advice, on doubt as to the effect
to be given to an appeal under a new act and its effect as a
supersedeas.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Possibly it would be well if common law marriages were
once for all abolished by statute; as long as they are permitted,.
be protected by
Common Law however, they should, of course,
agree with the
but
cannot
we
the courts, and
Marriages
majority of the court in Comly's Estate, 39 Atl.
(Pa.) 89o, that evidence that the alleged common law wife
had, prior to the date of the alleged marriage, lived in meretricious relations with others was not relevant to the question of
marriage itself.
Under the community theory in vogue in Louisiana thecreditor of a spouse, when the community is dissolved by the
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Conmunity

death of the other spouse, may not proceed
directly on
against the undivided interest of his debtor
spouse
the community property, but
should

first force a final settlement of the survivor's interest in that
property: Pior v. Giddens, 23 So. (La.) 337.
A wife left her husband's house on account of his unkind
treatment. Several months later she returned without his
request,
but was put out of his house and sent to
Divorce,
r
Desertion
a farm-house
belonging to him. Held, that this
act was notice to her of his intention to exclude
her from his home and that he did not want her society. Hence,
her act in then leaving him was not such wilful desertion as
would entitle him to a divorce: 71fiisgrave v. Miisgrave, 39
Atl. (Pa.) 960.
In re De Nicols [1898], I Ch. 403, presents, apparently for
the first time in England, an interesting question, to wit: Are
the
ho rights of a married woman in the property of
Married
her deceased husband to be determined by the
Woman's
Residence,
law of the place of the marriage, or the law of the
Conflict of domicile of the family at the time of his death?
Law
Kekewich, J., held to the former view, and thus decided that the property earned while decedent was a naturalized
citizen of Great Britain was subject to the community doctrine
of the French law, because of the marriage having taken
place years before. It is to be hoped that the question will be
passed upon by a court of appeal, as the decision is contrary
to the American rule as stated in Story on Conflict of Laws,
and also apparently to a decision in Ireland and, possibly, a
dictum of Lord Eldon.
In a number of states, including New York, suits for alienation of a husband's affections are recognized at the present
day. It has recently been held that it is incumSuits for
Alienating
bent on the plaintiff in such suit to prove a wrongHusband's ful intent on the part of the defendant, proof of
Affections
her own attractiveness and of her pleasure at the
husband's attentions not being sufficient: Vitman v. Egbert,
49 N. Y. Suppl. 3.
INSURANCE.

The case of Woodside v. Canton Ins. Office, 84 Fed. 283, is
an illustration of the rules that a policy of insurance is to be
given a reasonable interpretation, and that an
"Personal
Effects,"
ambiguity in such a policy is to be resolved in
Interpretation favor of the insured.
The policy was for $2ooo
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upon property consisting of various articles of clothing, an
organ, silverware, nautical instruments, charts, etc., which
were described generally as "personal effects " and were
valued at the sum insured. On the margin of the policy was
the memorandum clause, "Warranted free from all average."
A sextant, a few charts and some articles of clothing, most of
them damaged and in all worth about $78, were saved from
the wreck of the ship.
The court held that the policy should be construed distributively, making each item of the "personal effects" retain
its separate and distinct character, rather than that the " personal effects" as a whole should be treated as an integral
subject of insurance. The decision is sustained by reference
to cases involving policies on goods of different and distinct
natures, where a general description was used for convenience;
a number of other cases are distinguished in which the insurance was upon the whole cargo as an integral subject.
We observe that the decree was for $2ooo and interest,
without allowance for the goods saved. The average-clause,
moreover, was certainly applicable for these, as there was not
a total loss.
MORTGAGES.

In Georgia, as in the majority of the states, it is settled that
a sale under a mortgage discharges the lien of a prior judgJudgment ment creditor, who must look to the fund
Prior
nrealized
for his satisfaction: Brunswick Co. v.
Bank of Brunswick, 23 S.E. (Ga.) 688.
A mortgaged to B, and subsequently sold to C; he then
made a payment to B on account of the mortgage debt, which
payment was subsequently rescinded by agreeRights of
Purchasers of ment between A and B. It was held that A and
Mortgaged
B could not by agreement adversely affect the
Property
rights of C, and that while A and B might have
agreed that subsequent payments by A to B should take the
place of this payment (which was now unsecured), yet there
was no evidence to show that the subsequent payments by A
to B were not, as they purported to be, payments on account of
the mortgage debt: McCown v. Westbury, 29 S. E. (S. C.) 663.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Virginia, in City of Lynchzburg v.
Wallace, 29 S. E. 675, affirmed the following instruction "that
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Obstruction
on Sidewalk,
What
Constitutes

it was the duty of the city to keep its sidewalk in
a reasonably safe condition, and free from obstructions dangerous to persons using ordinary care,
but that it was not liable for an accumulation of

ice or snow which produced mere slipperiness, but had not
become uneven or rounded, so as to form an obstruction."
The plaintiff had slipped on the sidewalk and sustained
injuries, as a consequence of which she was now suing the
city for damages.
NEGLIGENCE.

That there is some difference between a wagon and a bicycle as respects the law of the road was manifested in Taylor
v. The Union Traction Co., 184 Pa. 465, where it
Bicycles,
Right of Way was held, that notwithstanding the Act of April
23, 1889, P. L. 44, which gives to riders of bicycles the same
rights as persons using carriages drawn by horses, and a city
ordinance which gives vehicles on passenger railways, going
in the direction that the cars travel, the right to the track
when they meet vehicles going in the opposite direction, if a
bicycler, while riding between the tracks of a street railway in
the direction that the cars run, meets a wagon approaching him
on the tracks from the opposite direction, it is his duty to leave
the track, and if he fails to do so and is run down by the
wagon, he is guilty of contributory negligence.
Cia, of Hillsboro v. Jackson, 44 S. W. (Tex.) 98 1. In an
action against a city for personal injuries caused by an excavaExcavation, tion in a street, previous knowledge of the existKnowledge of ence of the dangerous place does not necessarily
Injured
show contributory negligence. The plaintiff had
Person
crossed the ditch on a visit to an acquaintance,
and on her way back, not knowing exactly where it was, it
being a dark night, and there being no light to apprise her,
she fell into it.. Held, the court could not charge her with
contributory negligence.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Schick v. Flciscllziauer,
49 N. Y. Suppl. 962, decided that a mere contract by a landlord to repair does not subject him to liability
Landlord,
Failure to for negligence for personal injuries resulting to the
Repair,
tenant from the landlord's failure to perform the
nauryto
contract, because the tenant has no right to stay
Tenant
in the premises when they are in an unsafe condition by reason of the landlord's neglect to perform the contract,
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but he may move out and defend in an action for the rent as
upon an eviction.
That the rule of " stop, look and listen," as applied to street
railways, is not an absolute and unbending rule, see Callahan
"Stop, look v. Phila. Traction Co., 184 Pa. 425, where it was
and listen,"
held that a person about to cross a street at a
Street
regular crossing is not bound to wait because a
Railways

car is in sight.

If a car is at such distance from

him that he has ample time to cross, if it is run at the usual
speed, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that he is negligent
in going on. The rule to stop, look and listen, applicable to
the crossing of steam roads applies only in.part to the crossing
of street railways. There is always a duty to look for an
approaching car, and, if the street is obstructed, to listen, and
in some situations to stop; but to cross the tracks of a steam
road in front of an approaching train will generally prevent
a recovery.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Wiley v. Smith, 49
N. Y. Suppl. 934, decided that a pedestrian has a right to
assume that street car tracks are in a reasonably
Street
Railroads,
safe condition at a particular point, although there
Detective
is no defined crossing, and the railroad company
Tracks,

Injury to

might not have anticipated that he would be liable

to cross there, and that if he uses due care, the
company is liable for injuries he sustains.
Pedestrian

PARTNERSHIP.

Until Porch v. Arkansas Milling CO., 45 S. W. 5 1, came on
for decision, the question of debtor's exemption in partnership
Joint Estate, property had not arisen in the Supreme Court of
Debtor's
Arkansas. A separate creditor obtained judgExemption
ment and proceeded under the local statute to
levy upon the debtor's interest in a partnership. The debtor's
statutory answer set forth that he was the head of a family,
etc., and that his entire estate, including his interest in the
property of the partnership, did not exceed the exemption
limit. A majority of the court, following the general rule as
approved in other jurisdictions, thought that as the partnership was a " going concern " the title to firm property was
not in the individual partners and that neither partner could
call such property his own within the meaning of the statute.
A minority, while agreeing with decisions to this effect where
exemption is claimed in specific chattels, thought that a dif-
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ferent result should have been reached in this case because
the debtor claimed his exemption in respect of the balance due
him on final settlement. The majority seem to have been
right. Whether upon the entity theory (which the court
tacitly adopts) or upon the common law theory of a joinl
estate; it is impossible to regard the partner as having a severat
title before liquidation. Without such a title there can be no
exemption. The opinion of the dissenting judge does not
meet the difficulty.
PRACTICE.
The Supreme Court of New York has decided that where an
attorney has been regularly appointed to appear on behalf of
Judicial Acts, the city in proceedings to condemn land for
Collateral
educational purposes, and the bills for such
services have been duly presented to the judge for
Attack
taxation, the act of the judge in passing upon their amount is
a judicial act which cannot afterwards be questioned by the
board of education. Peopleex rel.Allison v. Boardof Education
of City of New York (Supreme Court, App. Div. of N. Y.), 49
N. Y. Suppl. 915.
The aim of the common law was to produce singleness of
issue, but the rule against duplicity in pleading has long been
relaxed. The busy practitioner escapes mental
N. Y. Code
strain. The novice has relief from confusing and
Civil
Procedure, subtle distinctions, and the defendant has the
Pleading,
chance to set up his various defences, if he be
Separate
fortunate enough to have several, instead of being
Defences
cut down to the inflexible election of the old r6gime. The
exigencies of actual and active life and the demands of justice
worked a need for a change which showed strongly and
definitely in the enactment of the Statute 4 Ann. c. I6, § 4.
The provisions of this was that "it may be lawful for any
defendant or tenant, in any action or suit, or for any plaintiff
in replevin, in any court of record, with leave of the court, to
plead as many several matters as he shall think necessary for
his defence . . ." The course, as stated in Stephen on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.), 263, has been for the defendant, if he wished
to plead several matters to the same subject of demand or
;complaint, to apply previously for a rule of court permitting
him to do so, but (see note n.) the court has a discretion
either to permit or refuse according to the nature of the
matters proposed to be pleaded. It seems that in practice the
leave of court was not applied for, but the defendant might be
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compelled, if his pleas were inconsistent, and such as ought
not to be joined, to be compelled to chose between them:
LeConte v. Pendleton, I. Johns. Cas. io4. Well-known separate defences may now be made in the same action which
would have offended against the original rule. In these
instances a defendant is permitted to state more than one
matter as an answer to the complaint of the plaintiff, e. g.,
with non-assumpsit may be pleaded the statute of limitations.
or a discharge in bankruptcy or infancy. Double pleas have
long been used in Pennsylvania in the familiar short forms
which are universally accepted in this State and which are
sometimes readily "helped out" by separate notices of special
matter, under the rules of the respective Common Pleas Courts.
In the State of New York the Code of Civil Procedure, § 507,
provides as follows: "A defendant may set forth in his answer
as many defences or counter-claims, or both, as he has, whether
they are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable.
Each defence or counter-claim must be separately stated and
numbered. Unless it is interposed as an answer to the entire
complaint, it must distinctly refer to the cause of action which
it is intended to answer." It seems that the first sentence of
this section, being i5o Co. Proc., as originally enacted, ended
with the words, "but they must not be inconsistent with each
other," but these were struck out by the amendment of 1879:
Bliss' N. Y. Ann. Code. 379.
A recent case, Kelly v- Theiss, 49 N. Y. Suppl. i io8, and in
line with prior decisions, is an example of the freedom granted
to the pleader by this provision of the Code. To a complaint
which alleged that the defendant and another were co-partners
and as such executed a promissory note, therein set forth, an
answer was filed denying the allegations. The respondent
also alleged a separate and distinct defence. It was held that
the allegations in the affirmative defence, which described a
note made by the respondent, with a special agreement affecting the time of its payment, did not admit the allegations of
the complaint. The court said: "Under the system of pleading provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant is at
liberty to set forth in his answer such defences as he may
have, whether inconsistent or not." Another illustration of
this section of the Code is found in Bruce v. Burr, 67 N. Y.
237, in which a defendant was allowed to plead a rescission of
the contract, for the breach of which suit was brought on the
ground of fraud or mistake and also, as a separate defence,
a breach of warranty on the part of the plaintiff.
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There would seem to be no hardship from the opening of
this wide door, for there remains the requirement to separately
state each ground of defence. Where there is adequate notice,
so that the plaintiff may be prepared to meet each averment
that is set up by the defendant, the multiplication of issues has
apparently worked no injury in the trial of cases. No actual
injustice has been done because of the absence of the ingenuity
and learning of old-time special pleading.
REAL PROPERTY.

A stipulation in a deed that the property" shall be used for
residence purposes only" is broad enough to allow the erection
thereon of an apartment house, even though the
Deed,
Residence latter was built with a common dining-room where
Purposes,"
those occupants could take their meals who were
Apartment unwilling to keep up a private kitchen. The mere
House
mention of" residence purposes" does not demand
the erection of segregated private residences unless there is
something more in the deed to enforce this construction:
McMurtry v. PUMlls Investment Co., 45 S. W. (Ky.) 96.
In Airey v. Kunkle, 7 Pa. Super Ct I 12, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania has applied the rule of law that where, in a
conveyance, there is a conflict between the
Grant,
Boundaries, adjoiners and the courses and distances, the former
Construction shall control. The plaintiff's grantor had been
the original owner of the property in dispute, and, in a conveyance to begin so many feet from Street X, stated that the
property should extend between parallel lines at right angles
to Street Y. Street U formed an angle, slightly less than a
right angle, with Street X so that the conveyance attempted
to include a triangular piece of ground belonging to the
adjoining owner.
The grant was construed to mean, parallel to Street X,
some weight being given to the fact that a fence, erected by one
of the grantees and remaining undisputed for sixteen years,
followed a line parallel to Street X. As each grantee received
an area of land equal to what the deed purported to convey,
neither was damnified. Therefore, as only a party injured can
assert an estoppel, the grantees of neither could set up estoppel
as a basis of defence. Still less can a party whose error gave
rise to the estoppel assert it to establish his title.
In Leeds, Etc., Theatre v. Broadbent [1898], I Ch. 343, a
mortgage contained the provision that the principal money
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Mortgage,
Interest,
Punctual Payment

should not be required for three years if, in the
meantime, every half-yearly payment of interest
should be "punctually" made. Half-yearly interest
being due on August 15th, a demand was made

on the mortgagor and, after some correspondence between
mortgagor and mortgagee, a check for the interest was mailed
and received on August 24 th. An injunction having been
sought to restrain the mortgagee from selling the property for
default in payment of interest, the court was obliged to
construe the meaning of the word "punctually."
Kekewich, J., in the Divisional Court, held that it was not
to be taken in its strict and literal sense, but as it was used by
business men under such circumstances, and that in this case
a delay of nine days was not too unreasonable to be considered
without the limits of a "punctual payment." An injunction
against foreclosure was therefore granted, but it was dissolved
by the Court of Appeal, who, without discussion, said very
emphatically that a "punctual- payment" means a payment
on the day appointed and nothing else, so that the mortgagee
had a perfect right to take advantage of the breach of
covenant.
SALES.

A shipped goods to B who was to sell them, and remit the
proceeds to A, the net profit to be applied on a pre-existing
Held, the transaction
Consignment. debt owing: from B to A.
Interpretation
was not a purchase, B being merely an agent:
Barnes et al. v. .Darby et al. (Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas), 44 S. W.

1029.

SURETYSHIP.

Some familiar propositions are illustrated in Drescher v.
F/ulham, 52 Pac. (Colo.) 685 : (I) That parol evidence is
admissible to show that a joint maker of a note
is a surety, provided it be followed by evidence
Discharge
that the creditor knew he was only surety; (2)
That an agreement to extend the time of payment will relieve
surety where the consideration was an agreement of the
principal to pay interest for a definite period after the note was
due.

WILLS.

The testator left his estate to his wife, "for her absolute use
and benefit, so that during her lifetime she shall have the
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fullest power to sell and dispose of my said estate
absolutely. After her death, as to such parts of
lift Over on my estate as she shall not have disposed of, as
Failure to
aforesaid, I give intrust," for the benefit of certain
Sell,
Validity
persons. When the wife died the cestuis que
trstent brought an action against the devisees under the wife's
will. Held, that the wife had an absolute interest in her
husband's estate which was not cut down by the latter phrases
in the will and that the trusts after her death were therefore
void: In re Jones [1898]. i Ch. 439.
Although in Pennsylvania brothers and sisters of the half
blood, under § 6, Act of 8th April, 1833, P. L. 318, take with
those of the full blood, the effect of § 9 of the
Descent,
Brother ofthe same Act is to prevent a half brother by another
father from taking against a devisee under the will
Half Blood
of a granddaughter of the original purchaser: Henszley v.
Gross, 39 At1. (P4.) 949. § 6 provides: "In default of issue,
and brothers and sisters of the whole blood and their
descendants, and also of father and mother, competent by
this Act to take an estate of inheritance therein, the real
estate of such intestate, subject to the life estates hereinbefore given, if any, shall descend to and be vested in
the brothers and sisters of the half blood of the intestate,
and their issue, in like manner respectively, as is hereinbefore provided for the case of brothers and sisters of the
whole blood and their issue." § 9 imposes the limitation
that " no person who is not of the blood of the ancestors or
other relations from whom any real estate descended or by
whom it was given or devised to the intestate, shall in any of
the cases before mentioned, take any estate of inheritance
therein, but such real estate subject to such life estates as may
be in existence by virtue of this Act, shall pass to and vest in
such other persons as would be entitled by this Act, if the
persons not of the blood of such ancestor or other relation
had never existed or were dead at the decease of such intestate."
Absolute
Interest,

